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Centered just twelve miles outside the City of Watsonville, the 7.1 magnitude Loma Prieta earthquake hit Santa 
Cruz County in 1989, causing extensive damage. Community vulnerability to natural disasters can be reduced 
by incorporating hazard mitigation into mainstream land use planning processes. In this article, Emily Lipoma 
discusses her professional project for her MCRP in 2012, a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan for Watsonville. 
From October 26th to November 8th, 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted millions of people as the hurricane 
caused flooding and power outages through 16 states. 
Approximately 380,000 homes were destroyed or damaged 
and the cost of recovery is estimated at over $70 billion. 
From June 5th to June 16th, 2004, wildfire tore through 
7,500 acres of Santa Barbara County, threatening two 
oil refineries and 200 homes. These disasters and many 
others like them can cause deaths and devastate a town, 
region, or state in minutes or even seconds and take years 
of rebuilding. 
The severity of the impact is not only related to the 
intensity of the event (the magnitude of the event or the 
geographic extent of the affected area), but it is also related 
to the vulnerability of the community it affects. Complete 
protection from every potential natural or human-caused 
hazard is unlikely, but measures can be taken to prepare 
a community to respond and recover from a hazardous 
event and reduce the severity of future hazard impacts. 
Several authors suggest that community vulnerability to 
disaster can be reduced through appropriate land use 
management and by incorporating hazard mitigation into 
mainstream land use planning processes. In this context, 
mitigation is commonly defined as taking sustained 
actions in community planning to reduce long-term risks 
to populations and property from hazards (Schwab 2010, 
Schwab et al 1998). 
Hazard mitigation for a community can be undertaken by a 
number of different parties, although it is commonplace for 
planning departments to develop Hazard Mitigation Plans, 
either through incorporation into a General Plan or other 
long-range community guiding document, or as a stand-
alone Hazard Mitigation Plan. Developing a Local Hazard 
Mitigation Plan allows communities and stakeholders to 
identify and incorporate appropriate strategies to reduce 
the vulnerability of a locality. Objectives of such a plan 
include identifying vulnerable buildings and infrastructure, 
programming needed improvements into government 
budget priorities, and persuading private property owners 
to undertake similar commitments (Schwab et al 1998). 
Additionally, cities with completed Local Hazard Mitigation 
Plans are eligible to receive additional federal and state 
funding to rebuild affected areas.  
In 1988 the federal government established the Stafford 
Act, which established an emergency response and 
preparedness system: individuals and households can 
receive basic disaster relief, and jurisdictions can receive 
post-disaster infrastructure restoration grants and hazard 
mitigation grants to prevent repetitive losses. As time went 
on, it was found that programs encouraging mitigation 
reduced the amount of federal relief and recovery funds 
paid to states and localities after a disaster event: for every 
$1 invested in mitigation, $4 of disaster losses are avoided. 
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) further 
worked toward the goal of reducing risk before an event; 
the program is intended to reduce preventable, repetitive 
losses from disasters. 
However, eligibility for DMA 2000 grants requires a Multi-
Hazard Mitigation Plan as a precondition for federal 
mitigation project grants. DMA 2000 encourages state and 
local mitigation projects through financial incentives and 
competitive applications. Through incentives to encourage 
better development and planning decisions at the state 
and local levels, hazards can be mitigated before a hazard 
event (Topping 2011). 
The City 
The City of Watsonville is located in Santa Cruz County 
within coastal California and has a population of 51,199 
(2010 Census). The city is approximately 6.6 square 
miles and includes a prominent slough system within 
the city limits. The area has a strong agriculture-based 
economy and the city economy is closely associated with 
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the agricultural activities of the larger area. In 1989, a 7.1 
magnitude earthquake hit Santa Cruz County at 5:07 p.m. 
on October 17. The Loma Prieta Earthquake, centered 12 
miles outside of Watsonville, caused extensive damage 
throughout the county from the initial earthquake and from 
the 7,500 subsequent aftershocks which ranged from 1.0 
to 5.4 magnitude over the next two years. There were 63 
earthquake-related deaths (5 of which were in Santa Cruz 
County), and more than 3,700 injuries. 
Although the Loma Prieta earthquake affected a large
region, based on the damage Santa Cruz County was
clearly the hardest-hit area. Of the 988 homes destroyed,
744 were in Santa Cruz County, and of the 23,408 homes
damaged, 13,329 were in Santa Cruz County. Of the 366
businesses destroyed and 3,495 businesses damaged due
to the earthquake, 310 businesses and 1,615 businesses
respectively were in Santa Cruz County (Schwab, et al 1998).
In addition to the pure number of homes and businesses
affected, “damage was particularly acute for the cities of
Santa Cruz and Watsonville because the damage was con-
centrated in the downtown areas vital to the commercial,
residential, and social/cultural identity of the communities”
(Schwab, et al 1998). Watsonville sustained an estimated
$200,000 to $250,000 in sales tax losses in the years di-
rectly following the earthquake. In downtown Watsonville,
22 buildings were demolished, creating a loss of almost
700,000 sq ft of retail space. Approximately 90% of the dam-
age in the city was due to unreinforced masonry buildings
and wood-frame structures that were not properly fastened
to their foundation. Watsonville is built on soils that have a
moderate to high potential for liquefaction, lateral spread-
ing, and subsidence; and is built on areas with a potential
for landslides. Most of the Loma Prieta Earthquake dam-
age in the city was at locations where the soils liquefied. 
After the initial earthquake, aftershocks in Watsonville 
brought the possibility of additional damage. Tremors 
hit the primarily Latino residential areas near downtown 
Figure 1:  Damage to St. Patrick’s Church in downtown Watsonville after 
the Loma Prieta Earthquake. (Robert A. Eplett/ CAL EMA) 
particularly severely and 550 residences were yellow-
tagged (damage-limited entry) and 406 were red-tagged 
(major damage). An initial 1,500 people were homeless 
and many refused to enter buildings (including officially 
designated shelters) because of knowledge of the significant 
casualties caused by aftershocks in the earlier Mexico City 
earthquake. Language barriers further complicated relief 
and recovery efforts (Schwab, et al 1998). 
The initial temblor destabilized many buildings, ruptured 
natural gas lines, and disrupted water supply infrastructure.
Subsequently, fires broke out from natural gas leaks, and 
the inaccessible water supply paralyzed the effort to put 
out the fires. This synergistic effect of a multi-hazard event 
underscores the necessity of not only addressing individual 
hazards, but what could happen if other hazards were 
triggered at the same time. The Loma Prieta Earthquake 
also damaged the levees that protect the city from flooding. 
Had this major earthquake occurred later in the season 
when the water level was higher, significant flooding could 
have occurred as well, further damaging the city and 
hindering emergency response and recovery efforts. 
In addition to being located in a seismically active area, 
flooding and human-made hazards are also a risk to the 
City of Watsonville. Watsonville is bordered to the north 
and east by the Corralitos and Salsipuedes creeks and 
the Pajaro River, and there are substantial slough areas 
throughout the city. There are currently 11.5 miles of levees 
along the Pajaro River and 3 miles of levees along the 
Salsipuedes Creek protecting the city from flooding. The 
existing channel and levee system along the Pajaro River 
has approximately a 15-year storm capacity. The Corralitos 
and Salsipuedes Creeks have five- and seven-year storm 
capacities respectively. Substantial flooding has occurred 
most recently along these waterways in 1995 and 1998. 
In 1995 the Pajaro River and Corralitos Creek overflowed 
and flooded 3,280 acres. Agricultural crop damages 
Figure 2:  Damage to Highway 1 near Watsonville after the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake. Extensive damage to this critical roadway severely impacted 
earthquake recovery. (J.C. Tinsley, United States Geological Survey) 
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were estimated at $67 million and in the unincorporated 
town of Pajaro in Monterey (across the Pajaro River from 
Watsonville), damages were estimated at $28 million. In 
1998, 1,100 acres were flooded and approximately $1.7 
million in agricultural crop damages and $ 0.4 million in 
non-crop damages occurred.  These agricultural damages 
are considered to be low, because 800 of the 1,100 
flooded acres were in the preparation phase and without 
established plantings. 
In addition to the risk of economic loss around the city, 
several critical facilities within the City of Watsonville are 
within the 100-year floodplain. These facilities include the 
civic plaza, police headquarters, and a fire station, as well 
as several water pumping facilities. If shallow flooding does 
not exclude use of these facilities, it may impact their use 
and hinder city operations and emergency response. 
Levees protecting Watsonville are owned by the City, but 
are managed by the County. The inter-jurisdictional nature 
of the Pajaro River (it establishes the county line between 
Santa Cruz and Monterey counties and is a part of a 
watershed that extends into San Benito and Santa Clara 
counties) requires many stakeholders in the decision-
making process regarding the Pajaro River and its levees. 
The City has undertaken minor channel maintenance 
activities and levee studies, and the County and watershed 
joint agency have initiated studies and plans for major 
levee improvements and flood control projects. However, 
funding for the completion of the projects is lacking, and 
the City is not the primary decision-maker for major levee 
projects to increase the flood protection for the city. 
The city is surrounded by farmland, and within the city there
are many cold storage and pesticide facilities that require the
use of hazardous materials. Currently, approximately 95%
of the acutely or extremely hazardous material locations in
the county are in Watsonville (County of Santa Cruz, 2009).
During the Loma Prieta Earthquake there were a number
of significant hazardous material spills, although they were
primarily incidents where smaller amounts of materials
were released and mixed. Larger amounts of hazardous
materials were properly secured. The amount of hazardous
materials in the city presents a continuing risk and previous
releases underscore the potential for future events.
Watsonville is also at risk of several other hazards: Although 
wildfire risk has decreased with urban development, the 
severity of urban fires is increased due to older building 
stock and a dense population. Two of the past seven 
significant urban fire events in the city have occurred in 
structures that house vulnerable populations: The Wall 
Street Inn fire in 2005 displaced 50 elderly residents 
when a 94-year-old residential hotel caught fire, and the 
Stag Hotel fire in 2012 displaced 50 low-income residents 
from an 85-year-old residential hotel. These buildings and 
populations are equally vulnerable to an earthquake. 
Figure 3:  Repeated flooding of the sloughs has 
reclaimed Harkins Slough Road. (Emily Lipoma) 
The Project 
The City of Watsonville was approached in the fall of 2011 
to be the subject for a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan for a 
masters professional project at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo 
(Lipoma, 2012). Watsonville was identified as a suitable 
city because the city did not have a LHMP nor immediate 
plans to create one. There had initially been plans for a 
joint-LHMP between the county and the four cities within 
the county; however, it was not completed. There are 
several City-owned facilities that are non-contiguous to the 
main city limits: the wastewater treatment plant, city landfill, 
Pinto Lake (a city park), and water facilities. Additionally, the 
city water district and emergency response facilities serve 
county residents outside of the city and infrastructure for 
these city facilities extends outside of the City’s jurisdiction.
Initial response to the project proposal was supportive, 
yet skeptical. There were several aspects which allowed 
a student to undertake the project in coordination with 
the City. A Local Hazard Mitigation Plan had been on the 
drawing board for several years, but no funding had been 
allocated, and no action had been taken to initiate it. Thus 
key city staff had already recognized that such a plan 
would be beneficial to the city, but because such a plan 
had not yet been undertaken, the proposed project would 
not interfere with existing city projects. Furthermore, any 
progress that the proposed project made toward a Local 
Hazard Mitigation Plan would not require city funding. The 
final, and the most compelling, selling point to the city was 
that adopting an LHMP would make the City eligible for 
both mitigation and recovery grants for which they were not 
already eligible. 
Local Hazard Mitigation Plans are commonly integrated 
into the Safety Element of a locality’s General Plan, and 
there are state funding incentives to do so. However, 
the 2005 City of Watsonville General Plan update was 
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complicated by a lawsuit brought against the city by the 
Watsonville Pilots Association, a community group, and 
the Sierra Club. Subsequent court decisions found that 
the General Plan had not adequately discussed airport 
safety, among other issues. Because the Safety Element 
was specifically challenged, it was determined that a Local 
Hazard Mitigation Plan would not be incorporated into 
the city’s General Plan at this time. However, language 
specifying that an LHMP will be completed, adopted, and 
updated every 5 years was included as an implementation 
item in the Safety Element. 
Although LHMPs are commonly undertaken by planning 
departments, the Watsonville LHMP was developed 
through cooperation with the Fire Department and the 
Public Works Department. This project would not have 
been possible without the support and cooperation of the 
City Fire Department and Fire Chief Mark Bisbee, and the 
Public Works Department and Tom Sharp. By having a 
champion for the plan within the city staff, city resources 
such as expertise and data were available. Key city staff 
members were able to be channeled toward the project 
and develop interdepartmental support for the project.
Completion of the LHMP would have been very difficult, if 
not highly unlikely, without this support. 
The project was undertaken with the understanding that it 
was infeasible to complete necessary components of the 
plan within the timeframe allowed for the academic project. 
Thus the intent of the project was to complete the technical 
evaluation of risks so that the City could proceed with 
completion of a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
The technical evaluation included the identification of 
hazards and the development of a mitigation strategy. The 
risk assessment included an evaluation of development 
trends and goals, a review of past and potential hazardous 
events, and a vulnerability assessment of the types, 
potential locations and severity of hazardous events. The 
mitigation strategy would incorporate stakeholder input 
Figure 4:  Downtown Watsonville Plaza. (Emily Lipoma) 
to determine mitigation goals, objectives, and strategies 
to prevent significant loss. If time permitted, a qualitative 
cost analysis would provide a foundation for mitigation 
prioritization and implementation guidance. Guidance on 
development of an implementation and monitoring plan 
would be provided to the City to ensure identified strategies 
are incorporated into appropriate city plans. 
The risk and vulnerability assessment was directed by the 
Hazard Mitigation Advisory Team (HMAT). This team was 
composed of representatives from several city departments 
(including the Fire Department, Parks and Recreation, GIS 
and Public Works departments). At an initial meeting, the 
HMAT identified and prioritized natural and human-caused 
hazards which posed a risk to the city.  DMA 2000 grants 
are only applicable to natural hazards, and FEMA only 
reviews LHMPs for analysis of natural hazards; however, 
the Watsonville LHMP examined both natural and human-
caused hazards because there were several human-caused 
risks to the city, and additional information regarding these 
risks could only assist the city. Overall, the HMAT identified 
17 hazards to be examined in the LHMP: earthquakes, 
fire, flooding, hazardous materials, liquefaction and lateral 
spreading, land subsidence, landslides, unreinforced 
masonry structures, aircraft collision, civil disturbance/ 
terrorism, dam failure, drought, expansive soils, natural gas 
pipeline failure, vehicle collision, tornados, and tsunamis. 
This was an extensive list of hazards that may occur in the 
city. Many of these hazards were later determined through 
research to have a low probability of occurrence or a low 
probability of having a significant impact, or both. 
Each of the identified hazards was analyzed based on 
previous occurrences in the city, probability of future 
occurrence, and how severe future events could be. 
This risk was then examined as to how each hazard 
could impact critical facilities and vulnerable populations.
Critical facilities identified by the HMAT included city 
operation facilities (police headquarters, fire stations, city 
hall, hospital, etc.), Red Cross shelters, and critical city 
infrastructure (levees, bridges, and electricity substations). 
Vulnerable populations included schools and special 
population centers (elderly care facilities, day care facilities, 
the women’s shelter, and residential hotels for parolees 
and people recovering from drug and alcohol addiction). 
Historic buildings were also included for reference and in 
case the city decided in the future to specifically pursue 
hazard mitigation for historic buildings. The multi-hazard 
summary then showed all of the hazards to which the 
facility or population was vulnerable. This information was 
based on City GIS data and publicly available GIS data. 
Once the risk and vulnerability assessment was completed, 
the project transitioned into development of the mitigation 
strategy. While risk assessment relied on availability of 
data, development of a mitigation strategy was dependent 
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upon the expertise of the assembled Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Team. Unfortunately, the team was not ready to 
develop mitigation actions for the identified risks within the 
timeline for completing the academic project. The project 
scope was then modified to exclude completion of the 
mitigation strategy, and steps and actions were identified 
for the City to consider when developing a mitigation 
strategy independent of the academic project. 
Once the academic objective of the project was completed, 
the City decided to complete the project while there was 
still momentum to do so. The Public Works Department is 
overseeing and funding the completion of the project, which 
requires the completion of a mitigation and implementation 
strategy, a cost analysis, public review, and adoption of the 
plan by the City Council. 
Completing the Project 
Completion of the project is underway. Mitigation measures 
are being developed by small groups of city staff members 
who are most knowledgeable about the hazard and who 
have control regarding implementation of the actions. 
Descriptions of each mitigation action include: whether 
the action is a very high, high, or an important priority; 
whether the action has a high, medium, or low cost and 
benefit; which lead department will be responsible for 
implementation; what the timeline of the action is; what 
resources are required for implementation; where any 
funding will be derived from; and how each action will be 
incorporated into city operation. This additional information 
will inform the implementation strategy. 
Most of the mitigation actions in the mitigation strategy are 
being developed specifically by the city staff members who 
will be carrying the actions out. In this way, the mitigation 
actions are for the LHMP but initiative for their completion 
will be from the departments responsible for their 
implementation. It is likely that mitigation actions identified 
for the LHMP will be implemented as a department action 
rather than specifically as something that is for the LHMP. 
While developing the mitigation strategy, it was found
that there were several simple actions that could be done
to reduce the vulnerability of the city—essentially low-
hanging fruit (Lipoma, 2012). The risk assessment identified
and examined risk to the extent possible, but to further
understand hazards such as urban fire, subsidence, and
aircraft collisions to a greater depth, more data is required.
For instance, loss of life in urban fires can be reduced by
identifying high-risk structures and particularly vulnerable
populations (such as senior care and high-occupancy
facilities) and ensuring they are equipped with fire alarms
and fire suppression equipment.
In other cases additional communication and cooperation
between different agencies is needed.  Hazardous materials
are regulated by Santa Cruz County; communication and
cooperation between the County and City on the location,
amount, and type of hazardous materials within the city are
critical for guiding city-specific hazardous materials safety
requirements. These actions require little additional funding
and can be completed with existing staff resources, can have
a large benefit, and can initiate momentum for completing
larger and more costly mitigation projects.
Once all aspects of the plan are complete an administrative 
draft will be reviewed by city departments, neighboring 
communities, other government agencies, and the 
Red Cross. Action Pajaro Valley, a community action 
organization, will be invited to review the administrative 
draft as well. Any edits or comments will be incorporated 
into the draft before a final draft is presented to the City 
Council for adoption. Once the plan is either adopted or 
adopted with the condition of approval, it will be sent to the 
State and FEMA for review. 
Implementation of the Watsonville Local Hazard Mitigation 
Plan will depend on a few factors: a champion to ensure 
implementation and incorporation of the identified mitigation 
measures into city department plans. Charles Eadie writes 
that “hazard mitigation works best as a policy objective of 
local planning when it is so completely integrated into the 
comprehensive plan that it becomes a normal assumption 
behind all daily planning activities” (Schwab, et al 1998). 
While hazard mitigation planning in Watsonville has 
not likely reached “complete integration” with all normal 
planning activities, it is certainly much closer to achieving 
that objective. 
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